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Playing Chicken: Theology, Economics, 
Politics and Ethics in the Campaign for 
Better Conditions for Poultry1
David Clough2
Celebrity chefs are unlikely champions of the welfare of chickens, but 
in their televised campaigns beginning in January 2008 Hugh Fearnley-
Whittingstall and Jamie Oliver gave a high public profile to the conditions 
in which chickens are intensively farmed for meat and eggs in the UK. 
The campaign has met with some success: an RSPCA survey in February 
found that 73 per cent of consumers stated they had changed their buying 
habits after learning of the conditions in which chickens are farmed, and 
the demand for free-range chicken increased by 35 per cent,3 although Feb-
ruary also saw Tesco reduce the price of intensively farmed birds to �1.99.4 
The two campaigners used different methods and called for different out-
comes: Fearnley-Whittingstall built and stocked an intensive broiler shed 
to show the conditions in which chickens are raised, and tried to make the 
town of Axminster use more than 50 per cent free-range chicken.5 Jamie 
Oliver gassed a day-old chick live in a TV studio to show the realities of 
egg production as well as cooking some invited guests a meal. He asked 
people to buy chicken reared in sheds but under the RSPCA ‘Freedom 
Food’ standard, seemingly preferring this over recommending free-range 
chicken because of a concern for affordability of chicken for the poor.6 The 
Independent reported that demand for intensively reared chicken could 
have dropped by 10 million birds in February – perhaps accounting for 
Tesco’s discount policy – and claimed that the campaign had ‘changed the 
eating habits of a nation’.7 Whatever the truth of this claim, there is much 
of interest here in the negotiation of ethical norms in the human treat-
ment of non-human animals. For example, what ethical basis could under-
gird the nice ethical judgement that it is appropriate for human beings to 
kill chickens for food at eight weeks old, but only if they have access to 
open-air runs continuously during the daytime?8 Interestingly, Fearnley-
 Whittingstall provides a justification for his position with reference to 
theological argument, based on Stephen Budiansky’s The Covenant of 
the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestication, which in turn draws on 
Leopold’s Land Ethic among other sources. There are some similarities 
between Fearnley-Whittingstall’s position and that identified in the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food report on the use of new breeding 
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technologies of farm animals, though their views of the theological con-
tribution to the debate could not be more different. In what follows, I will 
reflect on the role theology plays in this public debate. I will also argue 
that theological accounts are promising in grounding different practices 
towards chickens and other non-human animals, although this promise is 
as yet for the most part unfulfilled.
 The first chapter of River Cottage Meat Book9 raises unusual questions 
for a cookery book: ‘Why do we eat meat?’ and ‘is it right, morally, that 
we do?’10 In it, Fearnley-Whittingstall argues that we eat meat because it 
comes naturally to us, but he also believes that this is not a sufficient moral 
defence of the practice. The first potential arguments he considers to justify 
meat-eating are what he calls Christian ones, which he renders as ‘a fairly 
crude citing of the scriptures’, specifically that Genesis 1.28 gives human 
beings the right to exercise dominion, that the Old Testament accepts sys-
temic animal sacrifice, and that Jesus did not question meat-eating. He 
suggests that together these are interpreted by Christians as approbation 
for slaughtering animals for food. He is not persuaded by these points on 
the very general ground that any religion’s argument for meat-eating is not 
a moral one because ‘The (mis)interpretation of scripture has been used 
as justification for some of the most appallingly cruel and immoral acts 
of history and continues to be to this day.’ In surveying other potential 
justifications, he judges that in a post-Darwinian framework, Kantian and 
Cartesian exclusion of animals from moral consideration are also implaus-
ible. The only people who would defend the Cartesian view of animals 
as merely machines against all the evidence of human/non-human con-
tinuity, he suggests, are those ‘regressing to some sort of theological jus-
tification’.11 Fearnley-Whittingstall expresses sympathy with vegetarians 
who oppose the suffering caused to animals, but considers it inadequate 
because we cannot reach a position of moral purity in relation to other 
animals. Drawing on Budiansky, he sees the relationship between humans 
and the animals that they raise for meat as ‘symbiotic’. The relationship is 
therefore advantageous to the animals who would not otherwise gain from 
being fed, sheltered and protected from predators and disease: 
They do not crave wilderness, or the freedom of their ancestors. They 
accept the way things are. And they thrive under these terms . . . I 
believe that, under the terms of this arrangement, farm animals can 
be healthy, contented, and even, at least in a sense that suits their spe-
cies, fulfilled – for the duration of their short lives.
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 It is crucial for Fearnley-Whittingstall that this is a contractual rela-
tionship which imposes onerous responsibilities on human beings; it is 
also important to him that this contract be seen as ‘not God-given, but 
man-made’.12
 There is much that one could engage with here on the adequacy of the 
moral case that Fearnley-Whittingstall makes for meat-eating. He notes 
himself that the argument is ‘fragile’, although in his view this is mostly 
because of the systematic abuse of animals in industrial meat production 
in the UK.13 He is no philosopher, and it is not hard to find fault with argu-
ments such as his: since animals will die anyway, we might as well kill 
them, especially after having made the case for continuity between the hu-
man and non-human moral spheres.14 Here, however, I am more interested 
in the function theology plays in his account. For Fearnley-Whittingstall, 
Christianity seems, in this context, to function as a potential prop for the 
assertion of an appropriate human dominance over non-human animals, 
and of an irrational qualitative separation between human and non-human 
animals. The case he makes for higher regard for other animals is explic-
itly anti-theological: it is only when we realize that our contract with other 
animals is something that we have created that we are able to recognize 
that the moral demand on us is not one that we can renege on.
 Stephen Budiansky, on whom Fearnley-Whittingstall relies, shares his 
lack of sympathy for theological argumentation, though for a different rea-
son. Budiansky’s emphasis is different to Fearnley-Whittingstall’s. Budi-
ansky argues for the same evolutionary co-dependence between human 
beings and the animals that they domesticate that Fearnley-Whittingstall 
cites, but for him, this is a defence of farming, rather than an argument for 
farming in a particular way. Budiansky makes no mention of a contract 
or of moral duties to animals. He is most concerned to make the case 
that human beings are part of nature, rather than standing apart from it. 
He sees humans’ relationships with other animals as part of a long and 
complex evolutionary development with mutual benefits, rather than as an 
example of unnatural and exploitative human activity. Budiansky is influ-
enced by the canonical ecological text A Sand County Almanac, in which 
Aldo Leopold argues for a holistic ‘land ethic’ where respect is attrib-
uted to the complex and interdependent ecosystems supporting all life.15 
In developing his case, some of his chief opponents are environmentalists 
and advocates of animal rights who are determined to ‘romanticize the 
perfection of nature’ and ‘ignore its obvious cruelties’. In these arguments 
Budiansky discerns an unhappy echo of
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efforts made a century ago by Christian theologians to reconcile the 
difficult fact that (1) God created the earth and all life thereon; (2) 
God is perfect in his judgment and his mercy; and (3) diseases, as 
biologists had begun to demonstrate, are caused by other living be-
ings, presumably just as much a part of God’s creation – the only 
difference being that their sole purpose in life is to inflict suffering in 
exceptionally unpleasant ways.16
Budiansky enlists the support of Mark Twain to illuminate the naïveté 
he sees in such views, citing the care Twain imagines God taking to ensure 
the preservation of diseases during the great flood: 
There were typhoid germs, and cholera germs, and hydrophobia 
germs, and lockjaw germs, and consumption germs, and black-plague 
germs, and some hundreds of other aristocrats, specially precious 
creations, golden bearers of God’s love to man, blessed gifts of the 
infatuated Father to his children – all of which had to be sumptuously 
housed and richly entertained.17 
Budiansky notes the difference that ‘The nineteenth-century theolo-
gians were trying to find in nature a reflection of God’s perfection, while 
today’s nature-worshippers are seeking to show nature as perfect in its own 
right’, but argues that these two positions have a common desire to ‘steer 
clear of troubling complications’.18 Where Fearnley-Whittingstall saw the-
ology as the prop for irrational views about the irrelevance of morality to 
non-human animals, Budiansky sees it as a basis for an unrealistic and 
misleadingly romantic view of what nature is like.
It is unsurprising that theology plays a different role in the very differ-
ent context of the 1995 Report of the Committee to Consider the Ethical 
Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Breeding of Farm Animals, 
but it is only when one is aware that the committee producing the report 
was chaired by Michael Banner, Dean of Trinity College, Cambridge and 
previously Professor of Moral and Social Theology at King’s College Lon-
don, that one guesses at the more sympathetic treatment it receives there. 
Banner’s vigorously Barthian approach to ethics is held in check for the 
most part, its mood surfacing only perhaps in the decisive dismissal of 
consequentialist moral theories as subject to such ‘very severe and sus-
tained philosophical criticism’ that ‘it can hardly be regarded as a sound or 
acceptable basis on which to advance recommendations of public policy’.19 
The report eschews an attempt to engage in moral argument with the posi-
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tion of those who think no use of animals is acceptable, or with those who 
consider that any use of animals can be justified, framing its reflections 
within the principles implicit in existing regulations that ‘use of animals, 
for any purpose, agricultural or otherwise, is acceptable, provided the 
use is humane’.20 The resistance to consequentialism is significant in the 
recommendation of the committee that there are some harms that should 
never be inflicted on any animal, no matter what the circumstances. The 
reason given for this is that animals cannot be seen merely as raw material 
for human projects: this is referred to as ‘overweening human pride or 
 hubris’ sometimes characterized as an attempt to ‘play God’. In a Christian 
context, the report notes that this position could be rooted in an apprecia-
tion of the world ‘as a created order which has been shaped by God and as 
such is to be accepted by us as having a good or integrity of its own’, and 
it observes that this position is also taken by other theistic religions.21 The 
report recognizes that theism is not the only basis for attributing respect to 
non-human animals, citing the palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould’s view 
that the process of evolutionary change itself is deserving of respect.22
Here, then, theological considerations are playing precisely the opposite 
role to that in Fearnley-Whittingstall’s cookbook. Fearnley-Whittingstall 
saw theology as providing a regressive justification for a Cartesian moral 
disregard of non-human animals, but Banner’s committee considers that 
Christianity is an important potential grounding of the opposite view that 
other animals are worthy of moral regard. Despite this difference in per-
spective, it is striking that the ethical implications of the two accounts are 
broadly similar. Both accounts argue that it is legitimate for human beings 
to make use of non-human animals provided they are treated well, which, 
both accounts agree, does not rule out rearing them for slaughter.
The comparison of the role of theology in these accounts prompts a 
range of questions, of which I will reflect briefly on two. First, given the dis-
agreement about the implications of a theological approach to the ethics of 
human practices in relation to non-human animals, what are we to make of 
the role theology does, or should, play in discussion of these issues? There 
is no doubt that the identification of theology as an enemy by Fearnley-
Whittingstall and an ally by the Banner report can be explained in part in 
relation to a difference in initial sympathy to, and knowledge about, the 
theological project. It would be too simplistic, however, to conclude that 
Fearnley-Whittingstall is merely misinformed. Christians were prominent 
in the defence of Cartesian views of non-human animals. For some Chris-
tians, this was the only way to defend the goodness of God in the face of 
the innocent suffering of non-human animals. Luther’s commentary on 
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Genesis celebrates the gospel good news of God’s promise that, despite 
all appearances, human beings are different in origin and destiny from all 
God’s other creatures. This is close to Fearnley-Whittingstall’s contention 
that theology serves to demarcate a qualitative distinction that flies in the 
face of biological evidence. Within the Christian tradition, ideas that seem 
to weaken the difference between human and non-human creatures have 
repeatedly been linked to atheism. It is a commonplace in modern theo-
logical discourse to ground ethical regard for human beings in the doctrine 
that all human beings are made in the ‘image of God’: alongside the prob-
lematic exegesis involved in this invocation, we should also note that this is 
the theological assertion of moral status independent of the characteristics 
of creatures in a parallel mode to both Fearnley-Whittingstall and Luther. 
Moreover, modern Christians often do defend meat-eating with the sort of 
crude exegetical appeals Fearnley-Whittingstall describes. It is true that 
such arguments need not be exegetically crude: there are resources in the 
tradition for a careful and sustained defence of meat-eating. It is also true 
that asserting a theologically based qualitative moral distinction between 
human and non-human creatures need not result in the Cartesian excesses 
where non-human animals were vivisected in the confidence that they are 
machines incapable of experiencing suffering: instead, we could recognize 
a different order of moral duties to non-human animals, or base norms 
against cruelty towards them on the potential impact to human beings, 
following Aquinas.23 But it is hard to deny Fearnley-Whittingstall’s point 
that theology can be used to maintain a qualitative distinction between 
humans and other animals that is hard to sustain on other grounds in a 
post-Darwinian context.
If Fearnley-Whittingstall is right on this, does this mean that Banner 
et al are wrong in seeing theology as a potential source of moral regard 
for non-human animals? The most significant theological argument cited 
in their report is that appreciating that the world has been created by God 
means recognizing that it has a goodness and integrity of its own, rather 
than merely being ‘raw material’ for our ends.24 While this argument is 
used to establish the opposite of the point Fearnley-Whittingstall seeks 
to make, it does not contradict his position. Recognizing the goodness 
of creation does not, of itself, establish in what this goodness consists, or 
what kind of actions might be considered to be consonant with respecting 
or disrespecting its goodness. If, as Calvin seems to think, the primary 
reason the universe is good is as an environment providentially provided 
by God for the benefit of human beings, then it is not clear that we should 
not use other animals as we like.25 Perhaps in reply we might say that 
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referring the good of creation to ourselves in this way would be to fail to 
recognize that creation has a good ‘of its own’. In the context of the report, 
this would be to say that there is value in the way creation is structured that 
should not be ignored in reshaping it according to human interest. Once 
we recognize that human beings must be understood as part of the order 
of creation, however, it is not quite clear how this argument will play out. 
Is it fitting for human beings to prey on other animals, just as it is fitting 
for lions to prey on gazelles, as part of this ‘good’ creation? Budiansky’s 
citing of Twain’s scepticism about the ways in which God’s goodness is 
manifest in the universe should alert us to the danger of loose claims in 
this area. A great deal more would need to be said to enable this argument 
to generate morally substantive conclusions. Certainly, not enough is said 
in the report in order to link this point to the ethical conclusion that there 
are some things one should never do to a non-human animal.
Having argued that Fearnley-Whittingstall’s conclusions about the role 
theology plays are better founded than those of the Banner Report, I should 
make clear that I share Banner’s belief that theology should be understood 
as grounding a profound moral regard for non-human animals. There is a 
wealth of evidence in the Bible for this position, and it is arguable that it is 
only in the modern period that theology has been systematically co-opted 
to make human beings the primary locus of moral value. In my view, the 
plausibility of Fearnley-Whittingstall’s position on theology in this discus-
sion is a symptom of the underdevelopment of Christian thinking about 
non-human animals: deploying Scripture and the Christian tradition to 
undergird grand claims for a qualitative moral distinction between hu-
man and non-human animals seems to me to look possible as a Christian 
position in the same way as it looked possible to defend slavery on the 
basis of Christian teaching in the nineteenth century. Therefore, those like 
Fearnley-Whittingstall who are critical of the theological legacy in this 
regard cannot be blamed for their interpretation until much more work has 
been done to establish a solid case for setting aside the lines of argument 
in the tradition to which he refers.
If this is a call to set the theological house in order in relation to the 
theology of non-human animals, my second point in conclusion is that 
there is also some disorder in the atheistic arguments in relation to non-
human animals I have surveyed. Fearnley-Whittingstall argues that there 
is moral continuity across the human/non-human borderline, but he also 
defends the routine slaughter of farm animals. If we are to give up on the 
qualitative distinction between human and non-human animals – which 
I agree we should – what is the morally relevant feature of domesticated 
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animals that means it is legitimate to raise them, but not human beings, for 
meat? The closest Fearnley-Whittingstall comes to an answer is to lean on 
Budiansky’s case that domesticated animals have evolved to be depend-
ent on human beings for care. Filling in gaps in his argument, we might 
reason that, given that they are particularly well-suited to being dependent 
on human beings for their well-being, to continue this natural relationship, 
including their slaughter, is appropriate. It is not clear that this point can 
survive the strong case he wishes to make against a qualitative moral dis-
tinction between human and non-human animals, however. Human babies 
have evolved to be heavily dependent on their mothers in their early life, 
and there is widespread evidence of infanticide as a human practice in 
particular circumstances, but I take it that Fearnley-Whittingstall would 
not condone its continuance. Without a qualitative distinction between the 
human and non-human and in the absence of other arguments it is hard to 
see what would morally justify using a non-human animal for food which 
would reliably prohibit the farming of human beings.
There are similar difficulties with the non-theological argument given 
in the Banner Report for resisting the idea that animals are merely raw 
materials. The report cites Stephen Jay Gould’s request for respect for the 
‘integrity of nature’ based on respect for the chance evolutionary process 
that brought it into being. This is close to the non-theological case Aldo 
Leopold makes for respect for the entirety of nature in his ‘Land Ethic’, a 
fundamental text for the ecological movement. Yet while we might have 
sympathy with the conclusion that all living things are deserving of regard, 
and might even agree that ecosystems as a whole have some kind of moral 
claim on us for their preservation, it is hard to establish a clear basis for this 
in the absence of a doctrine of creation. What is it about the outcome of a 
random process that is worthy of respect? Why should we give more moral 
regard to a mouse on this basis than we would to the event of rolling a six 
a hundred times in a row? If it is the complexity of that which is the result 
of this process, why are certain types of complexity, such as those we call 
living things, more worthy of regard than others, such as mountains, or 
stars? Responses could be made to these points, but it is not clear that they 
would be any more obviously rational or based in a post-Darwinian under-
standing of evolution than the theological ones that Fearnley-Whittingstall 
cites. In fact, it seems to me that theology offers the best route to escape 
an anthropocentric moral system, though, as I have noted above, there is 
significant work to do to realize its potential in this regard.
We have come a long way from the celebrity chefs and chickens with 
which we started this paper. What has this theological debate to say to 
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them? First, on the theological grounds I have sketched above, it seems to 
me obvious that Christians should agree with Hugh Fearnley-Whitting-
stall and Jamie Oliver in not consuming battery-farmed poultry. In fact, 
the theological case I would put forward would reject killing any animals 
for food in most circumstances, but that argument will have to await an-
other day.26 Second, it is clear that the arguments I have surveyed from 
Fearnley-Whittingstall are both unsympathetic to a constructive Christian 
contribution to this question and are also problematic in their foundations. 
This is inaccurate in relation to the potential theological contribution, but 
this mistake is understandable given the state of the theological discussion 
of these issues. Third, this does not make it inappropriate for Christians 
to make a strategic alliance with those who oppose this cruelty to non-hu-
man animals for whatever reason, and the Banner Report is one example 
of this common cause. Finally, theologians should note the shaky founda-
tions of the secular arguments in favour of better standards of non-human 
animal welfare, and work on developing a better theological account of 
non-human animals in order to ground a new theological ethical approach 
to their treatment by human beings.
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